America's semiconductor policy is missing a key piece
I’ve written a fair amount about the Biden Administration’s policies aimed at maintaining American dominance semiconductor industry — the CHIPS Act and the export controls on China. But what I’ve written only scratches the surface; this is an incredibly technically complex industry with incredibly complex supply chains. Without understanding the particulars of the industry, it’s very difficult to think about what the optimal policy should be. So I’ve resolved to get more guest posts and interviews from people who are more knowledgeable than myself.
One such person is my friend Steven Glinert, the founder and CEO of a semiconductor startup called Sphere Semi, who lives between Singapore and the Bay Area. His startup is still in stealth mode, so I can’t tell you what it does, but Steve has certainly been spending a lot of his time in recent years researching the particulars of the chip industry. So when he suggested a guest post, I was quick to accept.
Basically, the U.S. has been focusing a lot of its attention on cutting edge chips, hoping to build these on American soil and deny China access to the tools needed to make them. But Glinert argues that the U.S. needs to also start paying more attention to so-called trailing-edge or “foundational” chips — chips that China has all the tools to build, and can pump out in enormous volumes.
