Strategical asymmetry in a game theoretical model of a tactical nuclear first strike *
Nuclear deterrence has for long been based on the assumption of mutual assured destruction or MAD. The idea lies on a foundational assumption that a nuclear strike will always trigger a retaliation leading to a nuclear holocaust. In this paper, I argue using a simple game theory model that a first strike with tactical nuclear weapons will, under certain conditions, lead a non-MAD Nash equilibrium with an one-and-off gain for the party enabling the first strike. This should be taken as a serious warning against any escalation between nuclear powers.
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