Make the Pause on Risky Pathogen Research Permanent
Last October the White House announced a pause in federal funding for so-called gain-of-function experiments that increase the contagiousness or virulence of influenza viruses or of the coronaviruses that cause severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) or Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). With the announcement began a yearlong “deliberative process”; in the coming months a committee led by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity and the National Research Council must advise the U.S. government on whether to continue funding research of this kind.
The pause was long overdue. Mishaps in federal laboratories last summer reminded us that accidents happen in even the best facilities. Most dangerous pathogens under study in labs such as these are not highly transmissible, so the risk is largely confined to on-site workers. Gain-of-function experiments, especially those involving flu, are a different story.
Since at least 2005, researchers have been deliberately creating influenza viruses that are both highly virulent (killing several percent or more of those infected) and spread easily among humans. The most dangerous experiments involve strains that are unfamiliar to our immune systems; neither our natural defenses nor existing vaccines can protect us against them. They are called potential pandemic pathogens (PPPs) because an accident involving their release could cause a global catastrophe.
