Opinion: Most STEM Faculty Aren’t Trained to Teach
F or years, experts have debated how best to oversee the small subset of research in which scientists manipulate certain pathogens to make them more deadly or more transmissible. Such research has historically been funded by the National Institutes of Health, on the grounds that it might improve pandemic prediction, prevention, and treatment. Yet the NIH leaders who championed the work have also acknowledged that, absent stringent oversight, the research itself could spark a pandemic.
To receive federal funding, such high-risk work — sometimes called “gain of function” — must be evaluated by a government committee. That committee follows a framework that was influenced by guidance crafted, in part, by Gerald Epstein, a biosecurity expert who worked in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy from 2016 to 2018.
The risks of this research “do not disappear merely because no government funds are involved,” wrote Epstein in an article published last year in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Epstein isn’t sure if this type of work is happening in the private sector, but if it is, it is largely unregulated. Epstein would like to see oversight broadened, possibly through new legislation, expansion of certain government regulations, or increased scrutiny from companies that provide liability insurance.
