This is a guest post by my colleague Jamie Withorne. Jamie is a Research Assistant at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Her work focuses on emerging technology, North Korea’s sanctions evasion, and North Korea’s nuclear fuel cycle.
This is the first of a three part series that aims to provide an in-depth review of North Korea’s uranium conversion capabilities, including addressing what details presently remain unknown. While this series does not attempt to identify North Korea’s uranium hexafluoride production capabilities, it does analyze other North Korean uranium conversion operations, processes, and associated locations.
This series is divided into three parts: 1) a historical review of North Korea’s uranium conversion from 1983-2002 2) a historical review of North Korea’s uranium conversion from 2003-2010 and 3) a comprehensive technical analysis of North Korea’s uranium conversion processes.
During the 1983-2002 time period, North Korea declared its conversion operations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and nominally froze its conversion activities.