OpenSSH and Git on a Post-Quantum SPHINCS+

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2024-12-23 13:30:06

Are you aware that Git commits and tags may be signed using OpenSSH? Git signatures may be used to improve integrity and authentication of our software supply-chain. Popular signature algorithms include Ed25519, ECDSA and RSA. Did you consider that these algorithms may not be safe if someone builds a post-quantum computer?

As you may recall, I have earlier blogged about the efficient post-quantum key agreement mechanism called Streamlined NTRU Prime and its use in SSH and I have attempted to promote the conservatively designed Classic McEliece in a similar way, although it remains to be adopted.

What post-quantum signature algorithms are available? There is an effort by NIST to standardize post-quantum algorithms, and they have a category for signature algorithms. According to wikipedia, after round three the selected algorithms are CRYSTALS-Dilithium, FALCON and SPHINCS+. Of these, SPHINCS+ appears to be a conservative choice suitable for long-term digital signatures. Can we get this to work?

Recall that Git uses the ssh-keygen tool from OpenSSH to perform signing and verification. To refresh your memory, let’s study the commands that Git uses under the hood for Ed25519. First generate a Ed25519 private key:

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